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ABSTRACT
The idea of having the geolocation database monitor the sec-
ondary use of TV white space (TVWS) spectrum and assist
in coordinating the secondary usage is gaining ground. Con-
sidering the home networking use case, we leverage the ge-
olocation database for interference-aware coordinated TVWS
sharing among secondary users (home networks) using short-
term auctions, thereby realize a dynamic secondary mar-
ket. To enable this auctioning based coordinated TVWS
sharing framework, we propose an enhanced market-driven
TVWS spectrum access model. For the short-term auctions,
we propose an online multi-unit, iterative truthful mecha-
nism called VERUM that takes into consideration spatially
heterogeneous spectrum availability, an inherent character-
istic in the TVWS context. We prove that VERUM is truth-
ful (i.e., the best strategy for every bidder is to bid based
on its true valuation) and is also efficient in that it allocates
spectrum to users who value it the most. Evaluation results
from scenarios with real home distributions in urban and
dense-urban environments and using realistic TVWS spec-
trum availability maps show that VERUM performs close to
optimal allocation in terms of revenue for the coordinating
spectrum manager. Comparison with two existing efficient
and truthful multi-unit spectrum auction schemes, VERITAS
and SATYA, shows that VERUM fares better in terms of rev-
enue, spectrum utilization and percentage of winning bid-
ders in diverse conditions. Taking all of the above together,
VERUM can be seen to offer incentives to subscribed users
encouraging them to use TVWS spectrum through greater
spectrum availability (as measured by percentage of winning
bidders) as well as to the coordinating spectrum manager
through revenue generation.
1. INTRODUCTION
Home wireless use is on the rise. Given that people are
typically indoors 80% of the time and majority of that time
is spent at home where wireless Internet access is preva-
lent, global consumer Internet traffic trends also reflect home
wireless access trends. In particular, we can attribute the
growing home wireless use to video traffic, which already
dominates the global consumer Internet traffic and is ex-
pected to make up 80-90% of the overall traffic by 2017.
With the fiber based residential broadband access increas-
ingly becoming commonplace, the bottleneck for home wire-
less Internet access will shift inside the home in future. Be-
sides the conventional computing devices (e.g., PCs, laptops,
tablets, smartphones), a whole host of other devices in the
home are being equipped with wireless communications ca-
pability ranging from consumer electronics (e.g., TVs) and
home appliances (e.g., refrigerators) to smart meters, leading
to rise in in-home wireless use for multimedia distribution
and interconnection among various home devices. While
WiFi carries much of this home wireless traffic today, it is
unlikely going to be sufficient going forward — the 2.4GHz
band is quite overcrowded and there are range concerns with
the 5GHz band [1]. Thus it is believed that meeting capacity
and range requirements of future home wireless applications
necessitate the use of other portions of the spectrum [2].
In this context, the use of TV white space (TVWS) spec-
trum has been put forward as an additional complementary
means to cope with the growing home wireless demand [1,
2, 3]. In simple terms, spectrum white spaces are unused
portions of spectrum over space and time. TV white spaces
then are white spaces in the UHF TV band (470-790MHz
in the UK) as illustrated in Fig. 1. Fig. 1 (a) also shows
that digital terrestrial TV (DTT) transmitters and receivers,
and program-making and special events (PMSE) devices are
the primary users of the UHF TV spectrum. The parts of the
spectrum which are unused by those primary users at a given
location appear as spectrum white spaces as illustrated in
Fig. 1 (b). Such white spaces can be used on an opportunistic
basis by other secondary users provided no harmful interfer-
ence is caused to existing primary users (i.e., DTT receivers
and PMSE devices like wireless microphones). In fact, the
TVWS spectrum is (being) opened up by regulators world-
wide for unlicensed secondary use (sometimes also called
secondary spectrum commons) subject to interference pro-
tection for primary users. Moreover, there is now a general
consensus among various regulatory proposals for TVWS
use that geolocation database will be the mechanism to en-
sure primary user protection in the foreseeable future as other
alternatives like spectrum sensing are unreliable or too ex-
pensive for the TV bands [4, 5]. With this mechanism, each
secondary user (or its proxy) needs to first query a geolo-
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Example: TV white spaces in London
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Source: Ofcom
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(b)
Figure 1: (a) UHF TV spectrum in the UK where each
channel is 8MHz wide; (b) TV white spaces in most of
London.
cation database providing its location to obtain the available
TVWS channels. The geolocation database calculates its re-
sponse based on the secondary user’s location, DTT trans-
mitter locations, propagation modelling and active PMSE
users. Several TVWS oriented standards that use geoloca-
tion databases have already been published or in develop-
ment (e.g., IETF PAWS, IEEE 802.19.1, IEEE 802.22, IEEE
802.11af, IEEE DySPAN-SC).
Home wireless networking makes a compelling use case
for TVWS spectrum for three reasons: (1) it has superior
propagation characteristics resulting in at least 4 times greater
range compared to 2.4GHz band for the same power lev-
els [6]; (2) there is more spectrum available for low power
use that is sufficient for indoor wireless applications — for
example, the recent TVWS related consultation from UK
Ofcom [7] shows that there are 30 channels available in cen-
tral London at the low power level of 10dBm but increasing
the power level to 35dBm drops that to 20 channels; (3) a
recent measurement study [8] shows that in urban areas up
to 20% more TVWS spectrum is available indoors compared
to outdoors due to natural barriers in the form of walls.
The focus of this paper is on the key secondary coexis-
tence problem that arises when considering the use of TVWS
spectrum for home networking, which is to effectively share
the available spectrum among secondary TVWS users (in-
cluding home networks) to utilize it efficiently and also keep
mutual interference low. Till date though, much of the fo-
cus on TVWS spectrum management justifiably has been on
interference protection for primary users for the case of a
single secondary user. Given that TVWS spectrum is un-
licensed subject to primary protection via the geolocation
database, it is in principle possible to take an uncoordinated
approach for TVWS spectrum sharing like it is currently
the case with WiFi. However, uncoordinated use via naive
ALOHA like strategies risk unbounded interference among
secondary users and consequently result in ineffective use
of this new source of spectrum as demonstrated in Fig. 6.
Even sophisticated alternatives following the uncoordinated
approach (e.g., 802.11af1) have limitations such as leading
to starvation for some users when there are a heterogeneous
set of secondary users [9]. Note that TVWS spectrum is
being considered for a wide range of uses from home net-
working and indoor hotspots to machine-to-machine (M2M)
and public outdoor small cells [3]. As such, heterogeneity of
secondary users is inherent to TVWS spectrum.
In this paper, we take a coordinated approach to TVWS
spectrum sharing among secondary users (including home
networks) by leveraging the geolocation database. The need
to consult a geolocation database before using TVWS spec-
trum naturally presents an opportunity to rely on the database
not just for primary protection but also for coordinating spec-
trum usage among secondary users. This possibility has
been alluded by the authors of the SenseLess geolocation
database system [10]. The centralized TVWS spectrum co-
ordination2 also eases handling of heterogeneous secondary
users. The idea of having the geolocation database moni-
tor the secondary use of TVWS spectrum and assist in co-
ordinating that usage is actually gaining ground as can be
seen from [3, 11] and the proprietary White Space Plus ser-
vice [12] provided by Spectrum Bridge, one of the approved
database providers in the US and UK.
We present our coordinated TVWS spectrum sharing pro-
posal in the context of home wireless networking use case.
In particular, we introduce a centralized database assisted
spectrum manager for home white space networks (HWSNs)
that offers a coordination service for effective TVWS spec-
trum sharing among home networks with low mutual in-
terference and efficient spectrum utilization. The spectrum
manager’s coordination service is enabled by a market-driven
TVWS spectrum access model and the use of short-term auc-
tions to dynamically (re-)allocate TVWS spectrum among
home networks — winners of the auction at a particular point
in time can be seen as securing a temporary permit to use a
portion of the TVWS spectrum. Note that the key ideas of
market-driven spectrum access model and use of short-term
auctions underlying our proposal are more generally appli-
cable to other spectrum bands and use cases.
Specifically, we make the following contributions:
• We propose an auctioning based framework for coordi-
nated TVWS spectrum sharing among HWSNs. To en-
able this framework, we present a market-driven TVWS
1802.11af employs a similar medium access control (MAC) proto-
col like that in 802.11 (WiFi) standard but additionally has mech-
anisms to operate in TV bands and consult geolocation database
prior to TVWS spectrum use.
2One can draw parallels between our approach and cloud based
control of public WiFi hotspots as well as cloud RANs.
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spectrum access model as an enhancement to the cur-
rent secondary spectrum commons model. With this
new market based access model, every HWSN is a sub-
scriber to the TVWS coordination service offered by a
HWSN spectrum manager, which could be same as the
database provider in practice. HWSN spectrum man-
ager relies on the geolocation database for monitoring
and updating secondary TVWS spectrum usage, and at
the same time dynamically allocates TVWS spectrum
to HWSNs using short-term auctions.
• We developVERUM3, an online multi-unit auction mech-
anism to realize the HWSN spectrum manager’s co-
ordination service as mentioned above. The primary
design objective behind VERUM is to achieve an effi-
cient allocation, i.e., allocate spectrum to users (home
networks) who value it the most; revenue/profit maxi-
mization for the spectrum manager (auctioneer) is seen
as a secondary goal. We prove that VERUM auction
mechanism yields efficient allocation, and that it is truth-
ful thereby simplifying the user side behaviour in the
coordination process. In comparison with existing ef-
ficient and truthful multi-unit spectrum auction mech-
anisms [13, 14, 15, 16], VERUM takes an iterative ap-
proach that is fundamentally different and offers a sim-
pler means to ensuring truthfulness. VERUM handles
heterogeneous spectrum availability and demands, in-
herent to TVWS based home networking. It also al-
lows channel sharing among nearby home networks
subject to a specified interference limit. Moreover,VERUM
supports marginal valuations, which refer to the values
a bidder associates with the first channel in its demand
and every additional channel; marginal valuations aid
in achieving improved spectrum utilization and rev-
enue by facilitating flexible adaptation of satisfied de-
mand depending on spectrum availability.
• We evaluate VERUM using realistic TV white space
availability maps in the UK and actual distribution of
homes in urban and sub-urban environments. Our re-
sults show that VERUM performs close to optimal allo-
cation in terms of revenue. We also show that its per-
formance in terms of revenue, spectrum utilization and
percentage of winning bidders in the auction is better
compared to VERITAS [13] and SATYA [14], other
comparable efficient and truthful online spectrum auc-
tion mechanisms from the literature, as a result of its
ability to support channel sharing, heterogeneous spec-
trum availability and marginal valuations.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next
section discusses related work. Our system model, includ-
ing the proposed auctioning based HWSN spectrum coordi-
nation framework, is described in section 3. In section 4,
we detail VERUM, the online truthful and efficient multi-unit
3VERUM means truth in Latin.
auction mechanism we propose in this paper. Evaluation re-
sults for VERUM are presented in section 5. Discussion of
further issues is provided in section 6 and we conclude the
paper in section 7.
2. RELATED WORK
2.1 TVWS Research
Since FCC allowed unlicensed operation in TV bands in
November 2008, there has been a significant amount of re-
search activity focused on TV white spaces. These include
TVWS spectrum availability assessments in different regions
(e.g., [17] for US, [18] for Europe). Spectrum usage mea-
surement studies have also been carried out in different parts
of the world to assess the potential for opportunistic access
by secondary users in various licensed portions of the wire-
less communications spectrum, including the UHF spectrum
with TV white spaces (e.g., [19, 20]). Platforms based on
networked spectrum analyzers for distributed spectrum sens-
ing have also been developed for real-time spatio-temporal
usage maps for TVWS spectrum and other applications (e.g.,
SpecNet [21]).
The pioneering work of Bahl et al. [22] identifies salient
aspects of TVWS spectrum in comparison with WiFi — spatio-
temporal variation and spectrum fragmentation, and imple-
ments the WhiteFi system prototype that incorporates tech-
niques to handles these aspects. The same team has subse-
quently deployed the first operational white space network
at Microsoft Redmond campus based on WhiteFi [6]. While
the focus of WhiteFi is on a single access point (AP) with
multiple associated clients, Deb et al. [23] consider a multi-
AP infrastructure wireless LAN scenario and address the
load-aware white space spectrum distribution, extending the
previous work on the same problem for WiFi by Moscibroda
et al. [24]. Progress has also been made on other core tech-
nologies needed for the use of TVWS spectrum, including:
geolocation database systems (e.g., [10]); simultaneous use
of spectrum fragments or non-contiguous portions of TVWS
spectrum (e.g., [25]); and addressing MAC and link adapta-
tion issues in white space networks (e.g., [26]).
Concerning the problem tackled in this paper — TVWS
spectrum sharing among secondary users, it is sometimes
subsumed under a more general term called coexistence. As
the geolocation database is a common entity that needs to
be consulted anyway to avoid harmful interference to pri-
mary users (e.g., DTV receivers), it makes a natural candi-
date to additionally provide a common store for monitoring
secondary TVWS usage and thereby assist in coordinated
TVWS spectrum use. This possibility has been accommo-
dated in recent works [10, 3]. Villardi et al. [11] take it a
step further and use this capability as a part of their cen-
tralized coexistence mechanism which involves TVWS ac-
cess points making independent decisions on secondary use
based on the TVWS spectrum availability information (in-
cluding other secondary use) retrieved from the geolocation
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database. However, they only outline the scheme without
providing details on how channel selection is made. In fact,
the authors in [11] themselves state that their focus is on pro-
viding a coexistence framework and not on the actual deci-
sion making mechanism. Somewhat similar to [11] is IEEE
802.19.14, a radio technology independent standard that is
currently under development for coexistence among dissim-
ilar TV Band Devices (TVBDs) and dissimilar or indepen-
dently operated networks of TVBDs.
2.2 Auctions for Dynamic Spectrum Access
Auctions have been extensively used over the years for
dynamic spectrum management with several different types
of auction mechanisms developed to suit different scenar-
ios [27, 28]. In the TVWS context, the work by Bogucka
et al. [29, 30] is the closest to ours in that they also em-
ploy short-term auctions for secondary use of TVWS spec-
trum. However, there are several crucial differences. Firstly,
they target a very different use case of secondary licensing of
TVWS spectrum to mobile cellular operators (LTE) for of-
floading during peak traffic periods. As a consequence, there
are a small number of bidders (operators) allowing them to
rely on computationally expensive “branch-and-cut” opti-
mization method. In contrast, in our problem setting there
could be a large number of home networks participating in
the auction. Secondly, the objective of the auction in [29,
30] is to maximize revenue and they employ an untruthful
first price sealed bid auction to achieve that objective. They
also place substantial focus on reserve price estimation given
their revenue maximization goal. This is unlike our approach
where we primarily target an efficient auction by allocating
spectrum to those users who value it the most. As another
difference, there is no notion of channel sharing among dif-
ferent users in [29, 30]. The above discussion further high-
lights the fact that different use cases and objectives neces-
sitate different auction mechanisms.
Outside the TVWS context, there are other auction mech-
anisms in the literature for dynamic spectrum management
based on cognitive radios that could be adapted to our prob-
lem setting. In the following, we mainly discuss the auction
mechanisms from previous work that are most relevant from
this perspective, i.e., the ones which are suitable for auc-
tioning multiple objects while at the same time efficient and
truthful.
Zhou et al. [13] propose VERITAS, a truthful online auc-
tion scheme for dynamic spectrum management. A bid-
der must have the same valuation for all the channels and
this is reflected in the pricing function, where every chan-
nel allocated to the bidder is charged at the same price. In
other words, VERITAS does not support marginal valua-
tions. It also does not support channel sharing, where a chan-
nel could be shared by neighboring home networks. Finally,
VERITAS does not support heterogeneous channel availabil-
ity, an inherent characteristic of TVWS networks. Modify-
4http://ieee802.org/19/pub/TG1.html
ing VERITAS to support marginal valuations, channel shar-
ing and heterogeneous channel availability, however, is non-
trivial.
Kash et al. [14] propose SATYA, a truthful auction scheme
for spectrum sharing that uses bucketing and ironing of bids
to maintain monotonicity for truthfulness. While this is the
first scheme to support channel sharing it has a few draw-
backs. Firstly, it does not support marginal valuations. Sec-
ondly, it has an exponential run time and is only polyno-
mial under some restrictions. Finally, the performance of the
scheme is highly dependant on the bucketing function which
is not part of the SATYA mechanism and is abstracted out.
Wu et al. [15] propose a truthful auction mechanism SMALL
for non-cooperative wireless networks. They group bidders
into non-conflicting groups and use a pricing function that
is independent of the buyers’ bid. However it is not suit-
able for online auctions because for SMALL to be truthful,
it needs the optimal solution for graph coloring, known to be
NP-complete. Moreover, SMALL does not support marginal
valuations, channel sharing and heterogeneous channel avail-
ability.
Hoefer and Kesselhiem [16] study truthful spectrum auc-
tions for secondary markets. They propose randomized al-
location algorithms for weighted and unweighted conflict
graphs that yield truthfulness in expectation. Truthfulness is
achieved using the randomized meta-rounding framework [31].
While the auction schemes offer near optimal guarantees on
social welfare, they are not suitable for online operation. The
convex optimization techniques that are used for applying
randomized meta-rounding have runtime that exponentially
grows with number of nodes in the conflict graph used to
model interference relationships among different users.
To summarize, qualitatively speaking, in comparison with
the auction mechanisms discussed above, the novelty of VERUM
proposed in this paper is that it is an online scheme that
supports marginal valuations, channel sharing and hetero-
geneous channel availability. While SATYA also supports
channel sharing, it is only polynomial under certain restric-
tions. Moreover, as discussed later in section 4, VERUM
takes an iterative approach that is fundamentally different
from the other mechanisms and leads to not only simpler
means to achieve truthfulness but also offers other desirable
properties like transparency and privacy.
3. SYSTEM MODEL
3.1 Auctioning based Coordinated TVWS Spec-
trum Sharing Framework
In this paper, we are interested in TVWS spectrum shar-
ing among secondary users from the perspective of home
wireless networking. As such, home networks using TVWS
spectrum are secondary users of specific interest to us and
we refer to them as home white space networks (HWSNs).
Within each HWSN, TVWS spectrum access for in-home
white space devices (WSDs) is via the corresponding home
4
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Figure 2: The database assisted home white space net-
work (HWSN) spectrum manager illustrated. Each tri-
angle in the cloud corresponds to a potential secondary
user in the form of a home network. The ones colored
in blue are HWSNs that access the TVWS spectrum via
the HWSN spectrum manager shown, whereas the red
colored ones are considered as third party white space
networks (WSNs) that access the TVWS spectrum via
other spectrum managers. Grey colored triangles rep-
resent homes that do not use TVWS spectrum at a given
point in time.
TVWS access point (AP). In other words, the TVWS AP
acts as the master device and obtains the TVWS channel
availability information from the geolocation database on
behalf of its associated slave WSDs using the home broad-
band Internet connection to connect to the database5. Fol-
lowing [32], we assume that each AP includes its location
accuracy based on the expected distance to its furthest WSD
when querying the geolocation database to obtain available
TVWS channels for its WSDs. We work at the level of
HWSNs and assume that techniques similar to [22, 25, 26]
are employed within each HWSN for MAC layer operation
and aggregation of non-contiguous channels.
For effective TVWS spectrum sharing among home net-
works, we introduce an entity called HWSN Spectrum Man-
ager that is tasked with coordinating TVWS spectrum us-
age among HWSNs. Specifically, the spectrum manager al-
locates TVWS channels to HWSNs by taking into consid-
eration the TVWS spectrum availability and secondary us-
age information from the geolocation database, spectrum de-
mand information from each HWSN and mutual interference
relationships among HWSNs. In the spirit of [10] and [3],
we assume that geolocation database is continually updated
with secondary TVWS spectrum usage. Fig. 2 illustrates this
database assisted TVWS spectrum coordination framework
for home networks.
In our proposal, HWSN spectrum manager coordinates
TVWS spectrum sharing among HWSNs via short-term auc-
5The use of broadband connection to consult the database makes
the bootstrapping problem discussed in [10] a non-issue in our set-
ting.
tions. This would mean that the spectrum manager plays
the role of the auctioneer while HWSNs act as bidders (for
accessing TVWS spectrum). Unlike the conventional long-
term nation-wide spectrum auctions, short-term auctions al-
low HWSNs to share available TVWS spectrum over space
and time while keeping interference between them tolerable.
3.1.1 Market-Driven TVWS Spectrum Access Model
As noted at the outset, unlicensed access by secondary
users (secondary spectrum commons) with the requirement
to consult the geolocation database first (to ensure primary
protection) is the approach being adopted by regulators cur-
rently. Such an approach is sufficient when following an
uncoordinated approach to share TVWS spectrum. How-
ever it undermines the coordinated approach in an environ-
ment where there are a mix of coordinated and uncoordi-
nated users. For example, bootstrapping the coordinated ser-
vice by incentivizing uncoordinated users to take up the ser-
vice becomes an issue. Also in a mixed environment, users
who fail to access TVWS spectrum via the coordinated ap-
proach at a given point in time can attempt the uncoordinated
approach as a fallback and thereby hurt other users accessing
the spectrum via the coordination service.
Thus to enable auctioning based coordinated TVWS spec-
trum sharing, we envision an enhanced TVWS spectrum ac-
cess model which is market-driven. In this enhanced model,
different HWSNs (or more generally, users of TVWS spec-
trum) become players in the market who each place a value
on the TVWS spectrum that could potentially vary between
them and over time. They rely on a spectrum manager to
obtain access to TVWS spectrum. At any given point in
time, the role of the spectrum manager then is to allocate the
TVWS spectrum to users who value it the most while taking
into consideration mutual interference relationships among
them.
The implementation of the market-driven spectrum access
model outlined above is straightforward from a regulatory
viewpoint given that as per current regulations the database
needs to be consulted as a first step prior to TVWS spectrum
use. All that the database / spectrum manager needs to do ad-
ditionally by way of implementing the market-driven model
is to enforce priority to subscribers of the coordination ser-
vice and use a protocol that involves TVWS users to allocate
TVWS spectrum dynamically via short-term auctions. For
new white space spectrum bands in future, market-driven ac-
cess could be mandated by the regulator as the only means of
access just as some bands offer licensed or unlicensed access
currently.
The market based coordinated access model can be seen
as an intermediate one between the extremes of licensed ac-
cess and unlicensed access; it aims to combine the advan-
tages of both licensed and unlicensed models while avoiding
their disadvantages. It can also be viewed as a way of real-
izing a dynamic secondary market via regulator designated
band managers (e.g., database providers). There are other
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recent proposals for alternate spectrum access models that
also conceptually sit between (secondary) spectrum com-
mons and licensed access such as pluralistic licensing [33]
and licensed shared access [34]. While pluralistic licensing
aims to incentivize primary users to allow more spectrum
to be available under the secondary commons model, mar-
ket based access enhances secondary commons via coordi-
nation that prioritizes users based on their relative spectrum
valuations; in that sense, both pluralistic licensing and mar-
ket based access are complementary. Unlike licensed shared
access which is based on secondary exclusive licenses, mar-
ket based access can be potentially more efficient because
it is effectively a soft/dynamic licensing model. We leave
further discussion and comparison among various spectrum
access models for another paper.
3.1.2 Business Models for TVWS Coordination Ser-
vice
Within the context of the above market based spectrum
access model, every HWSN is a subscriber of coordination
service offered by a HWSN spectrum manager. We now
briefly discuss the business model aspect of such a coordi-
nation service. One possibility is that TVWS access can be
an add-on over the user’s monthly broadband subscription
fee for a small additional fee. Depending on their TVWS re-
lated fee, subscribers could fall into different classes (e.g.,
“gold”, “silver”, “bronze”) with correspondingly different
number of monthly credits that put a cap on TVWS spec-
trum usage (see section III.A.5 for a brief discussion on how
monthly credits can play a part when user attempts to use
TVWS spectrum). Alternatively, subscribers for the coordi-
nation service could be at the level of broadband providers
who in turn manage allocation of TVWS spectrum and pay-
ment internally with their subscribers.
The HWSN spectrum manager, while conceptually dif-
ferent from the database provider as shown in Fig. 2, can
in practice be the same as the database provider and offer
the coordination service for additional revenue generation.
Moreover, there may be more than one spectrum manager
in practice providing the coordination service just as there
would be several database providers. In such a case, TVWS
spectrum users will subscribe to one among the several man-
agers. We assume that the different spectrum managers con-
stantly synchronize the secondary use of TVWS spectrum
with each other.
3.1.3 Interference Modelling
Since potential interference among TVWS spectrum users
is a key factor to consider in the spectrum allocation, we
need to explicitly model interference between different HWSNs.
For this, we use the commonly used conflict graph model to
represent interference relationships among HWSNs. Specif-
ically, vertices in the conflict graph G correspond to indi-
vidual HWSNs. An edge exists between two vertices in G
if the corresponding HWSNs can interfere when using the
same TVWS channels. Several alternatives are possible to
infer such potential interference between a pair of HWSNs,
from the simpler protocol model to the more sophisticated
physical model with realistic propagation models [35]. In
this paper, we assume symmetric interference relationships
that results in an undirected conflict graph.
Fig. 5 shows an example conflict graph for a set of HWSNs
A-E within a given area. Interfering HWSNs are connected
by a line. Note that conflict graph in general may not be
a connected graph. In other words, it can be composed of
several connected components.
We use notation Ni to refer to the set of nodes to which
vertex i (a HWSN) is connected in the conflicted graph G.
Note that our auctioning based spectrum allocation frame-
work allows for sharing of TVWS channels among poten-
tially interfering HWSNs (i.e., neighbors in G) subject to
a pre-specified interference temperature limit. This is dis-
cussed further in section 4.3.
3.1.4 Heterogeneous Spectrum Availability
As incumbent TV broadcasters cover a large area, they
may not cause heterogeneous availability of channels within
a small area. PMSE (Program Making and Special Events)
users, on the other hand, may occupy some channels within
a small area thus could potentially cause differences in chan-
nels available over space and time. Third party white space
networks (WSNs), colored red in Fig. 2, that are subscribers
of other HWSN spectrum managers, will likely be the key
reason behind heterogeneous spectrum availability across dif-
ferent HWSNs. Third party WSNs access TVWS spectrum
through other HWSN spectrum managers and can therefore
impact the spectrum availability for other secondary users.
For example, consider the conflict graph shown in Fig. 5.
Suppose that HWSN E is accessing the TVWS spectrum
through another HWSN spectrum manager, then the chan-
nels used by HWSN E would be unavailable only for HWSN
D while the spectrum availability for other HWSNs A, B and
C may remain unaffected.
3.1.5 Spectrum Demands and Marginal Valuations
We assume that there is a mechanism available at each
home TVWS AP to translate aggregate throughput demands
from all in-home WSDs into an overall HWSN spectrum
demand for the home in terms of number of TVWS chan-
nels. For example, for a given spectral efficiency, the bit-rate
achievable for a channel with a certain bandwidth can be
determined (e.g., with 1bit/second/Hz spectral efficiency, a
8MHz channel would result in 8Mbps bit-rate.). The achiev-
able bit-rate so computed can be combined with the applica-
tion bandwidth requirement to deduce the number of chan-
nels needed. Continuing the example, if we consider a HDTV
streaming application with 20Mbps bandwidth requirement,
then accounting for losses in efficiency due to aggregation
of non-contiguous channels we need 3 channels each capa-
ble of 8Mbps bit-rate. In the case of channel sharing, the
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spectrum demand can include a fraction of a channel (see
section 4.3).
We further assume that there is a mechanism within each
bidder (HWSN) to generate private marginal valuations as
a vector of length equal to the number of requested TVWS
channels. Marginal valuations of a bidder refer to values
that the bidder associates with the first channel in its de-
mand and every additional channel. While aggregated band-
width needs of all in-home WSDs determine the spectrum
demand (number of TVWS channels requested) of a HWSN,
other factors like number of credits the user is willing to
spend at a given point in time, the set of individual appli-
cations driving the demand and their service requirements
(best effort vs. guaranteed service) will influence the choice
of marginal valuations. We assume that marginal valuations
of each bidder are weakly decreasing. Fig. 5 shows example
marginal valuations (with “V:” above each HWSN). Consid-
ering HWSN A in Fig. 5 as a specific example, A’s marginal
valuations show that it values the first channel it can get at
13, the second channel at 8 and a third channel at 6.
3.2 Problem Statement
Broadly speaking, the goal of the HWSN spectrum man-
ager in our auctioning framework is to allocate TVWS chan-
nels to each actively participating HWSN i in a set of n
HWSNs, each with spectrum demand, Di ≤ C, where C
is the total number of TVWS channels across all HWSNs
that can be allocated from HWSN spectrum manager’s per-
spective.
Recall that Ni represents the set of neighbors of HWSN
i. The aggregate demand of HWSN i’s neighbours is repre-
sented by D−i =
∑
j∈Ni
Dj .
To represent the spectrum available at HWSN i, we use a
bit vectorXi of sizeC. We refer to this vector as the channel
availability vector defined as
Xi(k) =
{
1 if channel k is available at i;
0 otherwise. (1)
We define the channel assignment vector Yi at i as,
Yi(k) =
{
1 if channel k is assigned to i;
0 otherwise. (2)
We also define the number of channels available at HWSN
i as xi =
∑C
k=1Xi(k), and the number of channels assigned
to i as yi =
∑C
k=1 Yi(k).
As already stated in section 3.1, in our framework the
HWSN spectrum manager coordinates the allocation of the
available TVWS spectrum among active HWSNs (secondary
users) in an interference-aware manner each time via a short-
term auction.
The primary design objective for our proposed auction-
ing mechanism VERUM described in the next section is that
it should lead to efficient allocation, i.e., allocate spectrum
to HWSNs that value it the most. Other key considerations
underlying our design are listed below.
• Truthful or Strategy-Proof: For every bidder, bidding
based on its true valuation should be its best strategy.
This eliminates the possibility of bidding strategies that
can affect the outcome of the auction. In our context,
the biggest advantage of a strategy-proof auction is
the simplification of bidder’s dominant strategy. This
facilitates implementation of the coordination mecha-
nism among HWSNs with less complexity.
• High Revenue: While this is not our primary goal, rev-
enue generation serves as an incentive for HWSN spec-
trum manager (the auctioneer) to run the secondary
spectrum use coordination service.
• Low Computational Complexity: This is needed for
real-time allocation and re-allocation of TVWS spec-
trum. It is challenging to meet with large number of
HWSNs with diverse time-varying spectrum demands
and channel availability bidding for spectrum in the
auction.
• Efficient Spectrum Utilization: This is the main moti-
vation behind dynamic spectrum access in general. As
such it is also an important goal for our work on fa-
cilitating effective TVWS spectrum use among home
networks.
4. VERUM AUCTION MECHANISM
4.1 Overview
The overall architecture of the system based on our pro-
posed auction mechanism VERUM is shown in Fig. 3 (a).
VERUM is an online iterative multi-unit auction mechanism
that spans multiple rounds. VERUM supports marginal val-
uations, channel sharing and heterogeneous spectrum avail-
ability. We also prove later in this section that it is truthful
and efficient.
The timeline for the system in operation is shown in Fig. 3
(b). Time is seen as a sequence of epochs, each consist-
ing of a short Auction Phase followed by a much longer
Spectrum Use Phase. Each Auction Phase consists of one
or more rounds involving interaction between the auction-
eer (HWSN spectrum manager) and bidders (participating
HWSNs) as part of the auction to meet the spectrum demand
of the bidders subject to their valuations, spectrum availabil-
ity and mutual interference relationships. At the beginning
of auction phase, the auctioneer announces the initial price,
i.e., the reserve price. It then waits for a bidding period to
receive demands from HWSNs. Depending on the demands,
the auctioneer may allocate one or more channels to some of
the bidders at the current round price. The auction then may
also proceed to another round by increasing the reserve price
to bring down excess demand. This process may continue
over several rounds until there there is no more demand to
be fulfilled. At the end of the auction phase, HWSNs whose
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Figure 3: (a) System architecture with VERUM (b)
Timeline of the auctioning based coordinated TVWS
spectrum access system.
bids are successful proceed to use TVWS channels they won
in the following Spectrum Use phase until the end of that
epoch. Same process repeats in the next epoch and so on.
In the following, VERUM is described in two steps start-
ing with the simpler case of exclusive channel use where a
channel is allocated only to a set of mutually non-interfering
HWSNs. In section 4.3, we build on the exclusive use model
to support channel sharing among HWSNs.
4.2 The Case of Exclusive Channel Use
4.2.1 Existing Auction Designs
We begin by considering alternative designs to motivate
our auction design. In our problem, individual bidders may
request multiple items (channels) with private and indepen-
dent valuations. Moreover, we seek an efficient and truth-
ful auction. Both of these would suggest the use of multi-
unit Vickrey auction proposed in the seminal paper [36]. In
the classical multi-unit Vickrey auction, there are K items
to be sold at the auctioneer and bidders submit sealed bids.
Winner determination is straightforward: K highest bids are
deemed winning bids. The price that each winner pays is
more involved in that a bidder who wins M items (M ≤K)
pays the opportunity cost for those M items. Specifically,
the bidder winningM items will pay the amount of the M th
highest losing bid for the first item, (M−1)th highest losing
bid for the second item and so on.
When we apply the above multi-unit Vickrey auction mech-
anism in the spectrum allocation context where spatial reuse
is allowed for efficient spectrum utilization and conflict (in-
terference) relationships need to be accounted, computing
Vickrey pricing described above becomes complex as each
bidder could be allocated a channel and there may as such
be no losing bid. We could simplify the pricing scheme but
that can come at the expense of truthfulness as illustrated in
the rest of this paragraph. Suppose channels are assigned in
a non-conflicting way starting from the highest bidder until
all the bidders are considered or the channels are exhausted.
Then consider the following pricing scheme: the winner i is
charged the highest bid of the unallocated conflicting neigh-
bor if there exists one, otherwise it is charged zero. How-
ever such as a scheme violates truthfulness. To see this, con-
sider the conflict graph shown in Fig. 4 where HWSNs A,
B, C, and D are bidding for one channel each and suppose
that there are two channels (C1 and C2) available at all the
HWSNs. When the bidders bid truthfully (i.e., at their val-
uations), it can be seen that the utilities are 5, 3, 0, and 1
with C1 assigned to A and D, and C2 assigned to bidder
B at prices 0, 1, and 1 respectively. If however bidder C
strategically bids 3 (exceeding its valuation and thus untrue)
with resulting increase in its utility to 1, all the bidders are
now charged zero (or some reserve price). An implication
of a truthful auction scheme is that the best strategy for each
bidder is to bid truthfully. By showing that the best strategy
for bidder C is not to bid truthfully we show that the auc-
tion scheme is not truthful. This is also discussed by Zhou
et al. [13].
Figure 4: Example which illustrates that variants of
Vickrey auction with simplified pricing can lead to un-
truthful allocation when applied to spectrum allocation.
Left side of figure corresponds to the truthful bidding
case while right one is for strategic bidding. In both
cases, V stands for bidder’s valuation for obtaining a
channel, B is the bid amount and U denotes the bidder’s
utility calculated as difference between its valuation and
the price it pays.
To ensure truthfulness, existing multi-unit spectrum auc-
tion schemes [13, 14, 15, 16] employ different means to re-
alize Vickrey pricing and end up being polynomial only un-
der certain constraints or have an exponential run time. All
these auction mechanisms are variants of the sealed bid auc-
tion scheme where the bidders submit sealed bids and the
auctioneer computes the winners based on all the bids. The
price that the winning bidders have to pay must enable truth-
fulness (e.g., via Vickrey or VCG pricing).
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In VERITAS [13], the auctioneer collects sealed bids from
all the bidders and uses a greedy algorithm for allocation. It
then determines a critical neighbor for each of the bidders
based on which the winning price is computed. To support
channel sharing, the critical neighbor determination scales
exponentially with the number of neighbors for each win-
ning bidder.
In SATYA [14], the auctioneer collects sealed bids from
all the bidders and uses a greedy algorithm for allocation.
During allocation, buckets are used to prevent non-monotonic
allocations and ironing is used to remove all possible non-
monotonic allocations. Note that an auction scheme is mono-
tonic if a larger bid from a bidder always leads to at least as
many channels being allocated as with a smaller bid. Mono-
tonicity is known to be a necessary and sufficient condi-
tion for an auction scheme to be truthful. The use of buck-
eting and ironing in SATYA results in loss of some chan-
nel sharing opportunities. On the other hand, its running
time scales exponentially with the number of neighbors with
whom channel sharing is considered.
In both SMALL [15] and [16], the auctioneer collects
sealed bids from all the bidders and uses VCG pricing to
achieve a truthful auction. VCG pricing is considered truth-
ful only if the underlying allocation scheme is optimal but
finding an optimal channel assignment is NP hard. SMALL
relies on obtaining the optimal solution for graph coloring
underneath. [16], on the other hand, approximation algo-
rithms are converted to truthful mechanisms using the ran-
domized meta-rounding technique and is used to achieve
truthfulness in expectation; however as noted before apply-
ing randomized meta-rounding results in prohibitive running
times for large conflict graphs.
4.2.2 Proposed Auction Design
We develop an iterative auction mechanism that is fun-
damentally different from sealed bid auction schemes dis-
cussed above. Specifically, we seek an iterative auction that
has the same outcome as a Vickrey auction. Moreover, as
stated at the outset, we would like our auction mechanism to
support marginal valuations, heterogeneous spectrum avail-
ability and channel sharing.
Iterative auctions have multiple advantages over sealed
bid auctions. The foremost advantage of an iterative auc-
tion is that it provides a simpler means to achieve truthful-
ness. Another compelling advantage is that iterative auctions
are transparent in the way they determine the outcome of an
auction. In other words, bidders can verify and validate the
auction outcome. To see why this might be important, no-
tice that when bidders do not pay the bidding price, they can
doubt the correctness of the auction scheme. In fact, a fre-
quently mentioned problem with sealed bid auction schemes
is that the auctioneer could create a fake second-highest bid
after receiving all the sealed bids from the bidders in order to
increase its revenue. This is a non-issue with iterative auc-
tions as faking a second highest bid might result in revenue
loss to the auctioneer as it is unaware of the private values of
the highest bidder.
Yet another advantage of iterative auctions is that they are
better at protecting the privacy of bidders’ valuations. It is
preferable for bidders not to be required to disclose their pri-
vate values as they could be based on sensitive information.
When compared to sealed bid (non-iterative) auctions, it-
erative auctions incur lower information revelation as they
do not share their value with the auctioneer. While sev-
eral solutions are available to protect the privacy of bidders
in a sealed bid auction, they either require a third party to
compute the outcome of the auction or require cryptography
techniques. Also, the desire to realize transparent auction
(i.e., the ability for bidders to validate the auction outcome)
might compromise privacy with sealed bid auctions by re-
quiring disclosure of several other bids.
The basis for our proposal, VERUM, is the ascending-bid
multi-unit auction proposed in [37] that is simpler yet shown
to be efficient and also replicate the outcome of Vickrey
auction. But Ausubel’s mechanism [37] was not intended
for dynamic spectrum sharing. As such it does not account
for any of the unique characteristics associated with the dy-
namic spectrum allocation in general and TVWS spectrum
secondary sharing in particular. Spatial reuse, which allows
multiple users to be allocated the same channel provided
they do not interfere with each other, is one such charac-
teristic that is already mentioned above. For example, con-
sider the conflict graph shown in Fig. 5 (a) . If HWSN E is
using channel 1, it is still available for use by HWSNs A,
B and C. Heterogeneous spectrum availability discussed in
section 3.1.3 is another characteristic. Channel sharing dis-
cussed in section 4.3 is yet another characteristic that needs
to be supported. Our contribution in terms of auction de-
sign lies in adapting the mechanism in [37] to factor in all
the above mentioned characteristics while preserving its de-
sirable properties like simplicity, truthfulness and efficiency.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time Ausubel’s
mechanism has been applied in the dynamic spectrum man-
agement context even though it has been around for some
time.
We now describe VERUM. Referring to Figs. 3(a) and 3(b)
, the auctioneer (HWSN spectrum manager) announces at
the beginning of the epoch a reserve price for the channels
and bidders (HWSNs) respond with the number of channels
they are willing to buy at price p1. The round price controls
the demand from each bidder in the sense that the number of
channels it can bid is determined by the number of channels
within its private marginal valuations that have higher valu-
ations than the current round price. In the example shown
in Fig. 5(a), if the current round price is 13, then demand
from node B is 1 as it has only one channel that has a higher
valuation than 13.
At each round t with price pt, the auctioneer determines
if for any bidder i the aggregate demand of bidder i’s neigh-
bors in the conflict graph D−i(pt) =
∑
j∈Ni
Dj(pt) is less
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than xi, the number of channels available at i. If so, the dif-
ference is deemed clinched and the new channels clinched in
this round are considered won by the bidder i at that round
price pt. Note that to allow for spatial reuse, we view only
the neighbors of a node in the conflict graph as its com-
peting bidders. For example in the conflict graph shown in
Fig. 5(a): A competes with B and C in the auction; C com-
petes with A, B and D; and E competes only with D. This is
unlike the classical multi-unit Vickrey auction or Ausubel’s
mechanism where all bidders compete with each other.
To handle heterogeneous spectrum availability, we intro-
duce the notion of exclusive channels. A channel k is con-
sidered exclusive to HSWN i if it is available for use only
by i and not by any of its neighbors. Some channels maybe
exclusive to a HWSN right at the first round of the auction.
Alternatively, channels may become exclusive to a HWSN
in subsequent rounds (associated with higher reserve prices)
when the demand of any of its neighbors reduces to zero.
In each round t, we identify the set of exclusive channels
and consider them clinched by the respective HWSNs at the
round price pt.
The above process repeats with increasing round prices
until there is no demand from the bidders.
Fig. 5(b) illustrates the working of the VERUM auction
mechanism for the example in Fig. 5(a). Note that in Fig. 5(a),
the set of channels available at each HWSN with “A:”. As
a specific example, HWSN A has two channels available (1
and 2). The number of channels a bidder is assigned is lim-
ited by the number of channels it has available. In the exam-
ple, A can be assigned at most 2 channels even if its demand
is more.
In the first round of the auction with price p = 1, the five
bidders A, B, C, D, and E bid for 3 channels each (as they
have higher valuations than the current round price). Since
there is excess demand, the auction proceeds to subsequent
rounds with the price getting incremented at each round. At
price p = 6, the cumulative demand of bidder E’s neighbors
is 1, where as 2 channels are available for use by E hence it
is assured of winning at least one channel. Considering this,
a channel is deemed clinched by bidder E at price p = 6.
Similarly at price p = 8, as bidder D’s demand drops to 0, E
clinches another channel. At this point bidder E has clinched
two channels as xE − D−E = 2, bidder E is assured of at
least two channels. At price p = 12, the cumulative demand
of bidder C’s neighbors (A, B and D) is 2 whereas there are
3 channels available for use by C. Hence bidder C clinches
a channel at price p = 12. Finally, at price p = 13, bidder
A’s demand drops to 0 and bidders B and C win a channel
each. Since no more channels can be assigned at this point,
the auction comes to an end with bidders B, C and E winning
1, 2, and 2 channels, respectively.
It can be clearly seen from the above example that the
result of the auction is efficient: the auction has allocated the
channels to the bidders who value them the most. The formal
proof is provided in section 4.4. It can also be seen that the
resultant pricing for channels won is equivalent to that of
multi-unit Vickery auction. For example, bidder C wins its
first channel at the second highest losing bid (p = 12) among
its neighbors in the conflict graph and the second channel at
the highest losing bid (p = 13). Similarly, bidder B wins a
channel at the highest losing bid amongst its neighbors.
Although the mechanism computes winner determination
and payments effectively, it does not allocate channels. In
the example discussed above, although we determine that the
bidders B, C, and E won 1, 2, and 2 channels respectively,
we did not identify the specific channels they won. This is
because we consider all items (channels) as substitutes in
the auction mechanism. We determine the actual channel
allocation using a greedy algorithm. We select the channel
that is available in the least number of the winning node’s
neighbors. This directly reduces the number of HWSNs for
whom a channel becomes unavailable.
From the above description, we can determine that VERUM
has a time complexity of O(LCn) where L is the number of
rounds that the auction takes and n is the number of HWSNs
in the network and C is the total number of channels avail-
able in the network. This shows that VERUM scales linearly
with the number of HWSNs in the network.
4.3 Channel Sharing Case
Here we show how to extend VERUM to support channel
sharing among interfering HWSNs. Towards this end, we
introduce the notion of usable channel opportunities. The
usable channel opportunities represent the total number of
opportunities potentially available to each HWSN to use the
available channels. In the exclusive use case, each HWSN
has no more than one opportunity to use an available channel
among a set of conflicting HWSNs. However with channel
sharing enabled, conflicting HWSNs may have more than
one opportunity between them to use a channel.
The usable channel opportunities of a HWSN i, Coppi , is
defined as:
C
opp
i =
C∑
k=1
∑
j∈Ni
Fj(k)×Xi(k) (3)
where Fj(k) ∈ {0, 1} is the channel usability factor that
indicates if channel k can be used by HWSN j.
The mechanism to determine if a HWSN can use a chan-
nel can be as simple as fixing the number of HWSNs per
channel, or based on a more realistic function like we do in
the following. Specifically, we use a function of interference
temperature and bandwidth given by:
Fp(k) =
{
1 if T (p, bp(k)) < τ and
∑
q∈Np
bq(k) < 1− bp(k);
0 otherwise.
(4)
where T (p, bp(k)) is the interference temperature, bp(k) is
the fraction of the channel bandwidth that the bidder p in-
tends to use on channel k and τ is the threshold representing
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Figure 5: (a) Example conflict graph with 5 HWSNs A, B, C, D and E (b) Example illustrating the working of VERUM
auction mechanism
tolerable interference level. The interference temperature is
a metric proposed in the literature [38] to quantify the inter-
ference among dynamic spectrum users. It is similar to noise
temperature and used to measure the power and bandwidth
occupied by interference.
Interference temperature can be computed for each HWSN
p as:
T (p, bp(k)) =
Powerp(p, bp(k) ∗B)
kB
(5)
where Powerp(p,B) is the interference power in watts cen-
tered at p while using channel bandwidth B in Hz and k is
the Boltzmann’s constant.
With usable channel opportunitiesCoppi defined as above,
extendingVERUM to allow channel sharing reduces to chang-
ing the criteria for clinching channels. Specifically, a bidder
i clinches m channels if its number of usable channel op-
portunitiesCoppi exceeds the aggregate demand of its neigh-
bors by m. The price paid by the winning bidder for a
channel k would now be a fraction of the exclusive price:
Pricesharedi (k) = Pricei(k) ∗ bi(k), where Pricei(k) is
the price paid if k was an exclusive channel and bi(k) is the
fraction of channel k that HWSN i utilizes.
Note that channel sharing realized as stated above would
always result in spectrum utilization and winning bidders
that is no worse than the exclusive use case. This is because
even if the channel demands of conflicting HWSNs are high
(e.g., bi(k) ≈ 1), the iteratively increasing price with each
new round would drive out excess demand eventually so that
Eq. 4 would be satisfied for at least one HWSN.
4.4 VERUM Truthfulness and Efficiency
THEOREM 4.1. VERUM is truthful.
PROOF. In order to prove that an auction mechanism is
truthful, we need to show: (i) the pricing function does not
depend on the bid of the winning bidder; and (ii) it is mono-
tonic, i.e., if bidder i wins a channel at bid p then he will win
the channel at any bid p∗ > p.
It is indeed the case that pricing function in VERUM does
not depend on the bid of the winning bidder. In any given
round, the number of channels won by a bidder i is not de-
pendant on i’s demand but instead on the cumulative demand
of i’s conflicting neighbors. Even more crucially, the price
that i needs to pay for the channels it clinches in a round t is
the round price pt, which does not have any relation with i’s
bid.
Now to the monotonicity. Assume HWSN i won a chan-
nel at bid p and at any of its subsequent bid p∗ > p, the
cumulative demand of i’s neighboursD−i(p) >= D−i(p∗).
The only way i could not win the channel at higher price p∗
is if the aggregate demand of i’s neighbors increases with
the bid p∗. This is not possible since we have assumed that
the marginal valuations are weakly decreasing (see Section
3.1.4), which results in monotonically non-increasing de-
mands with each new round. Thus i will always win the
channel at any bid p∗ > p.
THEOREM 4.2. VERUM yields an efficient allocation, i.e.,
spectrum is allocated to bidders who value it the most.
PROOF. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose that bid-
der iwins channel kwith valuation given by Vi(k) < maxj∈NiVj(k)
at price pt. Note that for the purposes of this proof we con-
sider that each channel is distinct, a general case compared
to what we had so far viewing all channels as identical and
as substitutes for each other.
When the bidder i wins channel k at round t with round
price pt, as per VERUM, the aggregate demand for channel
k from i’s conflicting neighbors must be zero. That would
happen if and only if ∀j ∈ NiVj(k) ≤ pt and Vi(k) > pt. In
other words,D−i(pt)(k) = 0 and Vi(k) > maxj∈Ni(Vj(k)),
a contradiction.
Hence we have the following. If a bidder i wins a channel
k then ∀j ∈ Ni Vi(k) > Vj(k) — the channel is allo-
cated to its highest valuing bidder, proving that the auction
mechanism is efficient.
11
4.5 Revenue Maximizing Integer Linear Pro-
grams
Even though revenue maximization is not the main objec-
tive behind the design of VERUM, we are still interested in
evaluating the revenue generated using it. In order to bench-
mark its performance in terms of revenue, below we formu-
late the revenue maximizing spectrum allocation problems
corresponding to the exclusive use and channel sharing mod-
els as integer linear programs.
We first introduce the notion of cumulative clinches Cti
that represents the total number of channels won by a bidder
i including the number of exclusive channels at i until round
t. Using this notion, the number of channels won until any
given round t can be quantified. Specifically it is defined as:
Cti = max {0, xi −D−i(pt) + Ei(pt)}} (6)
where xi is the number of available channels at bidder i.
D−i(pt) is the cumulative demand of bidder i’s neighbors
and Ei(pt) is the number of channels available exclusively
at i, both till round t.
The number of channels clinched at round t, cti, can then
be defined as:
cti = C
t
i − C
t−1
i . (7)
Now the total price Si paid by bidder i can be stated as:
Si =
L∑
t=1
pt × c
t
i (8)
where L is the number of rounds the auction takes and pt is
the price at round t.
4.5.1 Exclusive Use Case
If there are n HWSNs participating in the auction, then
linear program for the revenue maximization problem in the
exclusive use case is as follows.
Maximise : R =
n∑
i=1
Si subject to
∀i
C∑
k=1
i6=j
{Yi(k)× Yj(k)} = 0, ∀j ∈ Ni
∀i
C∑
k=1
{Yi(k)×Xi(k)} = yi
The first constraint ensures that the same channel is not as-
signed to conflicting neighbors and the second constraint en-
sures that only available channels are allocated to the HWSNs.
4.5.2 Channel Sharing Case
Similar to the exclusive usage model, we can formulate
the revenue maximizing spectrum allocation problem as the
following integer linear program.
Maximise : R =
n∑
i=1
Si subject to
∀i ∀k ∈ {1, .., C} T (i, bi(k))× Yi(k) < τ
∀i ∀k ∈ {1, .., C}
∑
j∈Ni
{bj(k)× Yj(k)} < 1− [bi(k)× Yi(k)]
∀i
C∑
k=1
{Yi(k)×Xi(k)} = yi
While sharing the channel among multiple HWSNs, the
first constraint ensures that the interference is less than a
given threshold. The second constraint ensures that enough
bandwidth is available for all the HWSNs sharing a channel.
The last constraint is as in the exclusive case.
5. EVALUATION
For our evaluation, we follow the auctioning based co-
ordinated TVWS spectrum sharing framework described in
section 3 with the HWSN Spectrum Manager as the auction-
eer and participating HWSNs with non-zero demand as bid-
ders. We compare the results obtained with different auction
mechanisms. Specifically, we compare VERUM with channel
sharing enabled against VERITAS [13] and SATYA [14], the
two existing truthful and efficient auction schemes that can
be applied for our problem setting. Recall that VERITAS
does not support channel sharing, whereas SATYA supports
channel sharing as well as heterogeneous channel availabil-
ity. For SATYA, we use a bid price based bucketing func-
tion as was done by its authors in [14]. To benchmark the
above three mechanisms with respect to the optimum, we
use the ILP from 4.5 with Vickrey pricing. Results shown
for optimal solution are obtained by solving the ILP using
the GUROBI solver6.
To examine the impact of the density of HWSNs, we con-
sider two different real residential environments: dense-urban
and urban. The house and building layout data for each
of these environments represent 1 square kilometer areas.
These data are obtained from the UK Geographical Infor-
mation System (GIS) database [39] for parts of London. The
dense-urban residential environment comprises of 5456 houses
or buildings, whereas 2435 houses/buildings are present in
the urban environment. The number of TVWS channels
available at any given location is computed based on pix-
elized data of coverage maps for UK TV transmitters. Across
the two environments we consider, we find that the maxi-
mum number of TVWS channels available over all locations
is 21 but some locations may have fewer than maximum
channels in the case of heterogeneous channel availability.
6http://www.gurobi.com/
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Fig. 6 shows average number of potential interferers for
the dense-urban and urban scenarios considered. As the in-
terferers are computed purely based on node (house) dis-
tribution and interference range without any assumption on
spectrum coordination, Fig. 6 reflects the worst-case inter-
ference experienced with uncoordinated TVWS spectrum shar-
ing among HWSNs. It can be seen that the potentially num-
ber of interferers are significantly high, especially for the
dense-urban scenario and higher interference ranges. These
results support the coordinated spectrum sharing approach
advocated in this paper.
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Figure 6: Average number of potential interferers in ur-
ban and dense-urban scenarios with different interfer-
ence ranges.
We realize diverse spectrum demands from different HWSNs
as follows. The average demand across all subscribed and
active HWSNs is a variable input parameter specified as a
percentage value. Demand for each HWSN (again as a per-
centage value) is then randomly generated so that overall av-
erage conforms to the specified input value. The demand for
a HWSN in terms of number of channels needed is obtained
by taking the product of its percentage demand and avail-
able number of channels (e.g., A HWSN with 80% demand
and 5 available channels needs 4 channels). Unless other-
wise specified, the default value for average demand across
all HWSNs is set to 60%. Marginal valuations for the set
of channels requested by a HWSN are also randomly gener-
ated so that they are weakly decreasing and each value falls
within the range of [0, 100] virtual currency units.
For evaluation purposes, we use a fixed interference range
based model to study the impact of different interference
conditions. By default we set the interference range to 30
meters. We also analyse the performance of VERUM with
different interference ranges in section 5.6.
5.1 Metrics
We use the following metrics in our evaluations:
• Revenue: The revenue the auctioneer (HWSN spec-
trum manager) obtains for managing access to TVWS
spectrum in an interference-aware manner. This is the
sum of the market clearing prices paid by all k win-
ning bidders in the auction R =
∑k
i=1 Si where Si is
given by Eq. 8. Note that the primary goal for VERUM
is to maximize the utility for all auction participants
rather than maximizing revenue, so we set the initial
round price (reserve price) for VERUM to a small value
(10 virtual currency units by default in our evaluations)
and increase the price with the sole aim of removing
excess demand.
• Spectrum Utilization: The percentage of available chan-
nels at each HWSN that are allocated (to any HWSN),
averaged across all HWSNs. One of the primary rea-
sons for the interest around TVWS spectrum is to achieve
better spectrum utilization. An efficient mechanism in
the spectrum utilization sense should be able to allo-
cate all the available channels given enough demand
for the channels.
• Percentage of Winners: The percentage of bidders who
are allocated at least one channel at the end of the auc-
tion. A higher value of this metric is preferred as that
indicates users have incentive to successfully partici-
pate in the auctioning based coordinated access method.
The number of winners, however, is constrained by the
density of the area and the mutual interference among
HWSNs in that area.
5.2 Revenue
Figs. 7 (a) and (b) show the revenue (in virtual currency
units) obtained with different auction schemes with varying
number of active subscribed HWSNs for urban and dense-
urban scenarios respectively. Note that varying the number
of HWSNs in either scenario only has the effect of varying
the area under consideration, thereby allowing us to study
how different mechanisms react to increasing scale in terms
of area and number of HWSNs for a given density. On the
other hand, the effect of HWSN density can be observed by
comparing urban and dense-urban scenarios. We notice that
there is a substantial drop in revenue generated by the auc-
tion for all mechanisms in the dense-urban case when com-
pared to the urban scenario. As the number of potential in-
terferers is greater in the dense-urban scenario (see Fig. 6),
there are correspondingly fewer channel reuse opportunities
in that scenario. This in turn has the effect of fewer winners
per channel and consequent reduction in revenue relative to
the urban scenario.
To better highlight the benefit of VERUM for revenue gen-
eration compared to VERITAS and SATYA, we show per-
centage reduction in revenue for these three mechanisms with
respect to the optimal case (ILP solution) in Figs. 7 (c) and
(d) for urban and dense-urban scenarios. The non-monotonic
trend seen for individual curves in those figures can be at-
tributed to the fact that auction mechanisms and the optimal
case have different objectives — while the optimal seeks a
revenue maximizing solution, the three auction mechanisms
assign channels to the bidders with the highest valuations.
This is also a key reason behind the reduced amount of rev-
enue generated by VERUM, SATYA and VERITAS to differ-
ent degrees compared to the optimal (non-zero percentage
13
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Figure 7: Revenue with varying number of active sub-
scribed HWSNs.
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Figure 8: Revenue with varying demand.
reduction in revenue in Figs. 7 (c) and (d)). The optimal
case to maximize revenue may allocate channels to HWSNs
with lower valuations if they allow for more winning bid-
ders. On the other hand, auction mechanisms considered
assign channels to HWSNs who value it the most regardless
of the consequence on revenue.
Comparing the three mechanisms in Figs. 7 (c) and (d),
we see that VERITAS causes the most drop in revenue with
respect to the optimal by as much as 35%. This is because
it does not support channel sharing. SATYA relatively fares
better primarily due to its support for channel sharing. Even
SATYA too results in close to 30% reduction in revenue in
some cases because the bucketing and ironing techniques it
employs limit channel sharing opportunities and hence the
revenue. Specifically, bidders in SATYA are not allowed to
share the channel with a neighbor placed in a higher bucket.
As VERUM does not impose such constraints to ensure truth-
fulness, it offers the best relative performance in all cases,
mostly within around 10% of the optimal and around 20%
revenue drop in the worst case. The harmful effect of con-
strained channel sharing support in SATYA is more notice-
able in the dense-urban scenario (Fig. 7 (d)), where effective
channel sharing is crucial to higher revenue and number of
winning bidders; in this scenario SATYA is more closer to
VERITAS than VERUM.
Similar observations as above can be made even with di-
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verse and varying demands. Fig. 8 shows percentage re-
duction in revenue relative to optimal for the three mecha-
nisms across a wide range of average demand settings from
20%–100% while keeping the number of active subscribed
HWSNs fixed at 2000. Results in Fig. 8 clearly demonstrate
the effectiveness of VERUM over SATYA and VERITAS in
optimizing revenue for the auctioneer while remaining truth-
ful and efficient.
Fig. 8 (c) and (d) demonstrates similar results as above for
different interference ranges while keeping HWSNs fixed at
2000 and average demand at 60%. In terms of reduction
in revenue with respect to the optimal, VERUM offers more
stable result across the two scenarios and different interfer-
ence ranges. As increasing the interference range has a sim-
ilar effect to increasing the density, the explanation given
for comparison between the results in Figs. 7 (c) and (d)
(and Figs. 8 (a) and (b)) applies till a certain interference
range, to a further extent for the relatively sparser urban sce-
nario. But for very high interference ranges, conflict graph
becomes fully connected severely limiting spectrum reuse
and consequently the revenue for all three mechanisms.
5.3 Spectrum Utilization and Percentage of Win-
ners
We now look at the relative performance of VERUM, SATYA
and VERITAS in terms of the other two metrics: spectrum
utilization and percentage of winners. Fig. 9 shows the re-
sults. It can be observed that spectrum utilization is higher
in the dense-urban scenario as a result of greater amount of
channel sharing among HWSNs. Percentage of winners is
seen to be lower in the dense-urban scenario. As noted al-
ready in section 5.2, with higher number of potential inter-
ferers channel reuse opportunities reduce, which in turn re-
duces the number of winners despite channel sharing. We
can observe from Fig. 9 that VERUM does comparatively bet-
ter both in terms of spectrum utilization and percentage of
winners. VERITAS performs worse in all cases as it lacks
support for channel sharing. SATYA gains in comparison
with VERITAS as it allows channel sharing. But the bucket-
ing approach underlying SATYA makes it lose out on some
channel sharing opportunities, explaining the performance
gap between SATYA and VERUM. This is more clearly seen
in the dense-urban scenario where effective channel sharing
is more crucial. In that scenario, SATYA’s spectrum utiliza-
tion is almost like that with VERITAS, and its differences
with VERUM for both the metrics are also more apprecia-
ble.
5.4 Impact of VERUM Parameters
In this section, we look at the sensitivity of VERUM to two
of its underlying parameter settings: reserve price and step
size. To study the impact of these two parameters we focus
on the case with 2000 HWSNs and 60% average demand.
5.4.1 Reserve Price
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Figure 9: Spectrum utilization and percentage of win-
ning bidders with varying demand.
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Reserve price in VERUM (the price announced by the auc-
tioneer in the first round) could be 1 or start at a higher level
p > 1. A higher reserve price can improve the revenue as it
is the minimum price that bidders need to pay to get access
to a channel. But increasing the reserve price can also result
in lower spectrum utilisation and in turn loss in revenue due
to some channels remaining unallocated even when there is
a real demand. The latter can occur because a high reserve
price effectively throttles bidders’ demand by allowing them
to bid only for the number of channels in their demand for
which they have a valuation greater than the reserve price.
The interaction between revenue and spectrum utilization
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Figure 10: Impact of reserve price (a) and step size (b)
on VERUM.
due to reserve price is shown in Fig. 10 (a). The maximum
spectrum utilization is achieved when the reserve price is
0. The reduction in spectrum utilization at a higher reserve
price represents the percentage of channels that remain un-
allocated even when there is demand. Unlike spectrum uti-
lization, revenue increases with reserve price until it is 20 for
the urban scenario (40 for the dense-urban) as the effect of
the reserve price being the minimum price paid for a channel
is higher than the revenue lost due to unallocated channels.
At higher reserve prices, the revenue lost due to unallocated
channels is much higher than any gain from higher reserve
prices, resulting in a much lower revenue.
5.4.2 Step Size
Step size is another parameter that influences the behav-
ior of VERUM. It is the increment amount by which price
is increased in one round to the next. Fig. 10 (b) shows the
impact of different step sizes on revenue and duration of auc-
tion (in terms of number of rounds to completion). Note that
the auction completes when none of the HWSNs have a valu-
ation greater than the current round price; in other words, the
demand for all of them effectively goes to zero. Both urban
and dense-urban scenarios have identical number of rounds
because we use the same marginal valuations for both the
scenarios.
As expected, the highest revenue is obtained with the small-
est step size. On the other hand, the auction takes most num-
ber of rounds to complete. Increasing the step size decreases
the revenue because a higher step size drives out demand
quickly and get the auction to a point when effectively all
HWSNs have zero demand even though there are still unal-
located channels, explaining the drop in revenue. Clearly, a
higher step size leads to auction completing in fewer rounds.
Interesting point to note is about how reduction in revenue
with increasing step size relates to the reduction in number
of rounds. It can be seen from Fig. 10 (b) that increasing the
step size from 1 to 5 results in about 15% loss of revenue but
reduces the number of rounds by 80%, suggesting a value
for step size that keeps the duration and overhead of auction
minimal without hurting the revenue much.
5.5 Heterogeneous Spectrum Availability
Spatio-temporal heterogeneity in spectrum availability is
inherent to the TVWS spectrum, even more so when TVWS
devices rely on different spectrum access models (e.g., co-
ordinated, uncoordinated) or when TVWS devices are di-
vided amongst multiple HWSN spectrum managers. To un-
derstand how different auction mechanisms behave in such a
situation, we model heterogeneous spectrum availability as
follows. Given a percentage of third party WSNs (40% by
default in our evaluations), we randomly select an equivalent
number of homes in the scenario considered (urban or dense-
urban) and label them as third party WSNs. These third party
WSNs are assumed to consume a certain specified fraction
of the available channels at their respective locations (0.7
by default in our evaluations). The combined effect of the
above is that different active and subscribed HWSNs would
see different sets of channels available, thus realizing hetero-
geneous spectrum availability situations.
Fig. 11 (a) shows the absolute revenue in virtual currency
units for different auction mechanisms including the opti-
mal in the dense-urban scenario with varying number of ac-
tive/subscribed HWSNs and 40% third party WSNs. Fig. 11
(b) shows the percentage reduction in revenue for VERUM,
SATYA and VERITAS with respect to the optimal. We see
that the revenue with VERUM is fairly close to the optimal,
within 10% of the optimal in most cases. On the other hand,
SATYA’s performance is only slightly better than VERITAS
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Figure 11: Revenue and spectrum utilization with vary-
ing number of HWSNs in the dense-urban scenario and
40% third party WSNs.
but much worse than VERUM. Heterogeneous spectrum avail-
ability necessitates a higher dependance of channel sharing
opportunities on the dividing HWSNs into buckets and or-
dering of buckets in SATYA. The ordering schemes used in
SATYA are too simple to exploit all the available channel
sharing opportunities. For the same reason, VERUM outper-
forms SATYA and VERITAS in terms of spectrum utiliza-
tion too as seen from Fig. 11(c). For instance, at 40% de-
mand VERUM improves spectrum utilization by around 30%
compared to SATYA and even more relative to VERITAS.
5.6 Additional Evaluation Results
5.6.1 Varying the Interference Range
So far the it has been assumed that the interference range
of the WSDs are fixed at a distance of 30 meters. Keep-
ing the values of the other parameters constant we vary the
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Figure 12: Varying Interference Temperature Limit
interference range of WSDs to 50m and 70m and the per-
formance of VERUM is shown in Fig. 13. Increasing the
interference range of the WSDs reduces the degree of chan-
nel sharing possible in the network. The consequence of
lower channel reuse can be seen in the significant reduction
in revenue generated with higher interference ranges. The
number of winners also decreases with higher interference
ranges due to the same reason.
Although the total number of opportunities for channel
reuse is lower, the average spectrum utilization in the net-
work does not change significantly. This is because, the
channel is still considered to be in use, although the number
of WSDs using the channel is lower. This shows the need to
keep the interference range of the WSDs minimal.
5.6.2 Varying the Interference Temperature
We effectively control the average number of neighbour-
ing WSDs sharing a channel, by varying the interference
temperature limit. The performance of VERUM with vary-
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Figure 13: Varying Interference Range: Figures a, c, and e corresponds to 50 m, and Figures b, d, f to 70 m
ing interference temperature is shown in the Fig.12. The rev-
enue generated increases with increasing interference tem-
perature limit as more WSDs are allowed to share the same
channel. It can be seen that the revenue increase is signifi-
cant because with a lower interference temperature limit, the
only sharing opportunities lost are the ones due to the in-
terference temperature. This means that bandwidth is still
available in that channel and relaxing the interference tem-
perature limit would enable the WSD to use that channel
thereby increasing revenue.
A WSD may share a channel with its neighbour if two
conditions are met, a) it does not violate the interference
temperature limit b) capacity available in the channel. At
lower interference temperature limits, even though there is
capacity available in the channels, some sharing opportu-
nities are not utilized as it would violate the interference
temperature limit. This can be seen as the increase in per-
centage of winners with increasing interference temperature
limit. Spectrum utilization also increases with higher limits
as WSDs who were prohibited from sharing can now share
the channel with its neighbours.
6. DISCUSSION
For simplicity of exposition, we have assumed that chan-
nel lease periods are identical across all HWSNs although
it is straightforward to accommodate variable lease times.
Extension to allow for varying leasing periods can be done
similarly to the "stickiness" concept used in [40]. Specifi-
cally, each channel can be associated with a minimum pe-
riod of time T units, but HWSNs are allowed to request
each channel for multiples of time T. However, longer dura-
tion allocations prohibit spectrum access by other HWSNs.
HWSNs, therefore, should be allowed prolonged spectrum
access only if they pay proportionately higher price. The per
channel reserve price is set by the auctioneer independently
for each HWSN depending on the requested leasing period.
Auctioneer will determine the spectrum availability for sec-
ondary access at each epoch by additionally taking into ac-
count previous allocations that span multiple lease periods.
Since our mechanism has a built-in discriminatory pricing
model, the implementation of this feature is trivial.
Secondly, VERUM is a type of multi-unit auction scheme.
While it considers all the channels as interchangeable goods,
in reality this is not the case. The characteristics of a channel
could vary depending on the physical location of the user.
In order to capture this it is not essential that the auction
has to be modeled as a combinatorial auction. By providing
the desired channel characteristics as an input to comput-
ing the channel opportunity factor a similar outcome can be
achieved.
Moreover, we have assumed that all channels have the
same fixed power limits. This however, is not realistic, since
the power limits depend on the distance from the TV-stations
and the environment. Moreover, two channels with different
power limits can support different data rates. The higher
data rate channels are considered of higher quality and, fol-
lowing the modern market economy, they should be more
expensive. To capture this, but at the same time maintain the
simplicity of our approach, channels can be categorized into
distinct classes each associated with a distinct quality. The
reserve prices of the channels within each class can then be
determined based on the quality of the channels within the
class (i.e., the higher the class, the higher the quality).
Also related to this is the interference model. We assume
a fixed interference range in the evaluation of the proposed
scheme. In reality, this is almost never the case. One of the
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primary function of the the TVWS database provider is to
implement an accurate interference model, which could be
based on a propagation model or on empirical data. This ac-
curate propagation model is used to create the conflict graph
which is provided as an input to the proposed scheme. The
discussion of an accurate interference model is out of scope
of the paper and we refer to [41] for a discussion on the tech-
niques at the TVWS database provider.
In practice, conflict graphs could be computed based on
propagation models, measurement calibrated propagation mod-
els, or measurements. While propagation based models are
the simplest, they are also the least accurate. Measurement
based models use exhaustive measurements covering all pos-
sible sender and receiver locations. The measurement cal-
ibrated propagation model removes the need for exhaustive
measurements by interpolating the signal strengths using cal-
ibrated models but still generating accurate conflict graphs
will low error percentage. Zhou et al [42] propose one such
model using a graph augmentation technique that also ad-
dress the aggregate interference in the network.
7. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have considered the problem of TVWS
spectrum sharing among secondary users with home wire-
less networking as the motivating use case. We have pre-
sented an interference-aware coordinated TVWS spectrum
sharing framework for home networks that relies on short-
term auctions and leverages the geolocation database to ad-
ditionally keep track of secondary use of TVWS spectrum.
To enable this auctioning based coordinated sharing frame-
work, we have outlined a market-driven TVWS spectrum ac-
cess model. For short-term auctions, we have developed an
online multi-unit auction mechanism called VERUM that is
shown to be truthful and efficient.
We evaluate VERUM using real home distributions in ur-
ban and dense-urban residential scenarios in London, UK
in conjunction with realistic TVWS spectrum availability
maps for the UK. Our evaluations show that VERUM per-
forms close to optimal in terms of revenue even though it
does not explicitly optimize revenue. Evaluations also show
that VERUM outperforms VERITAS and SATYA – the two
state-of-the-art truthful and efficient multi-unit auction schemes
– in terms of revenue, spectrum utilization and percentage of
winning bidders.
These results demonstrate that VERUM offers an effective
alternative to uncoordinated TVWS spectrum use for home
networking applications with incentives for both subscribed
users of the auctioning based coordination service as well as
for the auctioneer (spectrum manager).
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